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MISASSIGNING INCOME: THE SUPREME
COURT AND ATTORNEYS' FEES
Stephen B. Cohen'
This past term's Supreme Court decision in Commissioner v.
Banks and Commissioner v. Banaitis distorts foundational principles,
known as assignment of income law, which help identify the person
who must report income for federal tax purposes. The Court holds that
assignment of income principles require a plaintiff to report as income
the portion of a recovery paid to the plaintiffs attorney as a contingent
fee. As a result, the plaintiff is taxed at excessively high rates, which
may in some cases equal or exceed a confiscatory 100%. Taxing the
plaintiff on the attorney-fee portion of a recovery also undermines the
objective of federal fee-shifting statutes, which is to enable a prevailing
plaintiff to act as a private attorney general by employing an attorney
without cost. Although recent legislation changes the result in the future
for specified categories of litigation, including a wide variety of civil
rights and employment claims, there remain significant classes of cases,
including nonphysical torts, physical torts with punitive damages, and
environmental statutes with fee-shifting provisions, to which this recent
legislation does not apply and in which plaintiffs will continue to be
taxed unfairly under the Court's decision .

• Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. Charles Davenport,
Stephen Glass, Daniel Halperin, Albert Lauber, Laura Sager, Deborah Schenk,
Nancy Staudt, and Ethan Yale provided insightful comments on and criticisms of an
earlier draft. Anne Sias provided invaluable research assistance.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Over thirty years have passed since the Supreme Court last
considered foundational principles, known as assignment of income
law, which help identify the person who must report income for
1
federal tax purposes. Tax lawyers therefore expectantly awaited the
See generally 4 BORIS I. BITIKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION
OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS 'lI 75.1 (3d ed. 1999). The Supreme Court last
considered assignment of income law principles in United States v. Basye, 410 U.S. 441
(1973) (applying assignment of income principles to hold that payments for services
deflected to a retirement fund were presently taxable to individual partners of a
partnership). In the three decades since the Basye decision, the Court typically has
decided only a handful of tax cases each term. Moreover, those cases have usually
concerned technical interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) rather than
foundational principles. See, e.g., Gitlitz v. Commissioner, 531 U.S. 206 (2001)
(referring to the plain language of I.R.C. § 108 to resolve a conflict over the
1
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Supreme Court's decision this past term in Commissioner v. Banki
and Commissioner v. Banaitis,3 which applies these principles to
contingent attorneys' fees.
Unfortunately, the Court's decision, which requires a plaintiff to
report as income the portion of a recovery paid to the plaintiff's
attorney as a contingent fee,4 distorts assignment of income principles
by treating the recovery as the product solely of the plaintiff's claim
rather than the product jointly of the plaintiff's claim and the
attorney's labor. The Court also fails to provide convincing reasons
for refusing to apportion the recovery between the plaintiff and the
attorney according to their proportionate shares so that the plaintiff is
not taxed on the entire recovery, including the contingent fee. As a
result, the plaintiff is taxed at excessively high rates, which may in
some cases equal or exceed a confiscatory 100%.5
In addition, the Court unreasonably declines to consider the
conflict between its holding and the fee-shifting provisions of federal
statutes, under which the defendant must pay the attorneys' fees of a
prevailing plaintife These fee-shifting provisions enable the plaintiff
who cannot pay an attorney to act as a "private attorney general,,7

sequencing of pass-through and attribute reduction); United Dominion Indus., Inc. v.
United States, 532 U.S. 822 (2001) (holding that in calculating consolidated product
liability loss, a "single-entity" approach should be utilized, as opposed to a "separatemember" approach).
2 Commissioner v. Banks, 125 S. Ct. 826 (2005).
3 [d. The Supreme Court's order granting certiorari consolidated the two cases
for oral argument and decision. 541 U.S. 958 (2004).
4 Banks, 125 S. Ct. at 829.
5 The decision was unanimous, except for Justice Rehnquist who did not
participate. [d. at 826.
6 See, e.g., Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.c. § 1988
(2000) (providing for fee shifting in § 1988(b)); Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 204, 42
U.S.C. § 2000a-3 (2000) (providing for fee shifting in § 2000a-3(b»; Civil Rights Act
of 1964 § 706, 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5 (2000) (providing for fee shifting in § 2000e-5(k));
Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.c. § 3601 et seq. (2000) (providing for fee shifting in
§ 3612 (p»; Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.c. § 12101 et seq. (2000)
(providing for fee shifting in § 12205). The Supreme Court has interpreted these
statutes, which state that the court may award reasonable attorneys' fees to the
"prevailing party," as requiring an award of fees to a prevailing plaintiff, unless
special circumstances would make an award unjust. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461
U.S. 424, 429 (1983); N.Y. Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 68 (1980);
Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 401-D3 (1968).
7 See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 894 n.10 (1984); Christiansburg Garment
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vindicating national policy. Taxing the plaintiff on the attorney-fee
portion of a recovery, however, eviscerates the objective of the feeshifting statutes, which is to enable plaintiffs "to employ ... lawyers
without cost to themselves if they prevail.,,8
If the attorneys' fees had been fully deductible by the plaintiffs,
9
these cases would never have arisen. For the tax years in question,
however, the Internal Revenue Code (Code) restricted deduction of
1o
the attorneys' fees incurred by the plaintiffs in Banks and Banaitis.
The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (Jobs Act), enacted after the
Court had granted certiorari in these cases, makes attorneys' fees fully
deductible in the future for specified categories of litigation, including
ll
a wide variety of civil rights and employment cases. Nevertheless,
Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 416 (1978); Newman, 390 U.S. at 402.
8 Venegas v. Mitchell, 495 U.S. 82,86 (1990).
9 Banks, 125 S. Ct. at 830-31.
10 [d.
The attorneys' fees were classified as miscellaneous itemized deductions,
for which the deduction is limited under the regular tax and not available at all under
the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT). See 1.R.c. §§ 56(b)(1)(A)(i), 67(b), 68(a).
11 American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418.
Section 703 of the Jobs Act amended the Code by adding sections 62(a)(19) and
62(e). [d. at 1546--47. Section 62(a)(19) applies to attorneys' fees "in connection with
any action involving a claim of unlawful discrimination (as defined in subsection (e»
or a claim of a violation of [31 U.S.c. § 3721 et seq.] or a claim made under section
1862(b)(3)(A) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.c. 1395y(b)(3)(A»." [d. Section
62(e) further defines "unlawful discrimination" to mean,
an act that is unlawful under any of the following:
(1) Section 302 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (2 U.S.c. 1202).
(2) Section 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, or 207 of the Congressional
Accountability Act of 1995 (2 U.S.c. 1311, 1312, 1313, 1314, 1315,
1316, or 1317).
(3) The National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.c. 151 et seq.).
(4) The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.c. 201 et seq.).
(5) Section 4 or 15 of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(29 U.S.c. 623 or 633a).
(6) Section 501 or 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.c. 791 or
794).
(7) Section 510 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(29 U.S.c. 1140).
(8) Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (20 U.S.c. 1681 et
seq.).
(9) The Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988 (29 U.S.C. 2001 et
seq.).
(10) The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (29 U.S.c.
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because the Jobs Act applies only prospectively, it provided no relief
12
for Mr. Banks and Mr. Banaitis. More importantly, the Jobs Act
does not apply to significant classes of cases, including nonphysical
torts such as defamation,13 physical torts in which punitive damages
are awarded,14 and environmental statutes with fee-shifting
2102 et seq.).
(11) Section 105 of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (29 U.S.c.
2615).
(12) Chapter 43 of title 38, United States Code (relating to employment
and reemployment rights of members of the uniformed services).
(13) Section 1977, 1979, or 1980 of the Revised Statutes (42 U.S.c. 1981,
1983, or 1985).
(14) Section 703, 704, or 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.c.
2000e-2, 2000e-3, or 2000e-16).
(15) Section 804, 805, 806, 808, or 818 of the Fair Housing Act (42 U.S.c.
3604,3605, 3606, 3608, or 3617).
(16) Section 102, 202, 302, or 503 of the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 (42 U.S.c. 12112, 12132, 12182, or 12203).
(17) Any provision of Federal law (popularly known as whistleblower
protection provisions) prohibiting the discharge of an employee, the
discrimination against an employee, or any other form of retaliation or
reprisal against an employee for asserting rights or taking other
actions permitted under Federal law.
(18) Any provision of Federal, State, or local law, or common law claims
permitted under Federal, State, or local law(i) providing for the enforcement of civil rights, or
(ii) regulating any aspect of the employment relationship, including
claims for wages, compensation, or benefits, or prohibiting the
discharge of an employee, the discrimination against an employee,
or any other form of retaliation or reprisal against an employee for
asserting rights or taking other actions permitted by law.
Id. at 1547.
12 The Jobs Act states that the new provision "shall apply to fees and costs paid
after the date of the enactment of this Act with respect to any judgment or settlement
occurring after such date." !d. at 1548. The date of enactment was October 22, 2004,
while the settlements in Banks occurred on May 30, 1990 and October 26, 1995,
respectively. Id. at 1418; Commissioner v. Banks, Nos. 03-892, 03-907, 2004 WL
1562987 at *23, *108 (June 14,2004) (joint appendix to filings for writ of certiorari in
U.S. Supreme Court).
13 See generally Robert W. Wood, Supreme Court Attorney Fees Decision Leaves
Much Unresolved, 106 TAX NOTES 792, 795 (Feb. 14,2005).
14 If litigation involves a claim for physical injury, then the compensatory
damages, including any portion paid as an attorney's fee, are excluded from income
under section 104(a)(2). However, section 104(a)(2) does not apply to punitive
damages. Therefore, under Banks a plaintiff must report as income any and all
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15

provisions. In these cases, the Court's holding in Banks and Banaitis
will continue to cause the taxation of plaintiffs at excessively high
rates and will undermine fee-shifting provisions of federal law.
This article discusses how and why the Court went wrong, noting
not only the Court's written opinion but also issues raised during oral
argument and in the briefs that are not mentioned in the opinion but
may have affected the outcome. Part II details the background of
Banks and Banaitis. Part III describes the evolution of foundational
principles of assignment of income law and explains why these
principles do not support the Court's decision. Part IV criticizes the
reasons given by the Court for refusing to apportion the income
between the plaintiff and lawyer as joint producers of the recovery.
Part V shows that the Court's decision to disregard the conflict
between the federal income tax and fee-shifting statutes is based on an
untenable distinction between judgments and settlements that
undermines the objective of fee-shifting and is inconsistent with
settled tax law principles and practices. Readers who are already
familiar with the background of the litigation and the evolution of
foundational principles of assignment of income law may wish to skip
directly from this Introduction to Part III, Section B.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE LITIGATION

Banks and Banaitis involved plaintiffs who settled claims against
their employers for unlawful termination of employment and who
paid their attorneys a contingent fee. John W. Banks sued his former
employer, the California Department of Education, for employment
discrimination under federal civil rights statutes and the civil rights
16
provisions of the California Code. The employer paid Mr. Banks

punitive damages arising under a claim for physical injury, including the portion of
such damages paid as an attorney's fee.
IS Since amending the Clean Air Act in 1970 to include a citizen suit provision,
Congress has provided for fee-shifting in most major federal environmental
legislation. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 u.s.c. § 7401 et seq. (2000) (providing for feeshifting in section 7604(d)); Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.c. § 1251 et
seq. (2000) (providing for fee-shifting in section 1365(d»; Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.c. § 6901 et seq. (2000) (providing for fee-shifting in
section 6972(e»; Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq. (2000) (providing for fee-shifting in
section 9659(f».
16 Mr. Banks filed federal claims under 42 U.S.c. §§ 1981 and 1983 and Title VII
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17

$464,000 to settle the litigation. Mr. Banks in turn paid $150,000 of
this settlement amount to his attorneys pursuant to a contingent-fee
18
agreement.
Sigitas J. Banaitis sued his former employer, the Bank of
California, under Oregon state law, alleging willful interference with
19
his employment contract. The parties settled the case for a total of
$8,728,559, of which the employer paid $4,864,547 directly to Mr.
Banaitis and $3,864,012 directly to the attorneys representing Mr.
20
Banaitis. The contingent-fee agreement between Mr. Banaitis and
his attorneys determined the division of the settlement payments
21
between tern.
h
The issue in both cases was the same: whether the plaintiff's
income includes the amount of the recovery paid to his attorneys as a
22
contingent fee. The Supreme Court granted certiorari at the request
of the Solicitor General to resolve a conflict among the Courts of
23
Appeals. The Court decided for the government, holding that "the
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, as amended, 42 U.S.c. § 2000e. Commissioner v. Banks,
125 S. Ct. 826, 829 (2005). He also filed state claims under section 12965 of the
California Code. [d.
11 [d.
18

[d.
[d. at 830.
20
[d.
21
[d.
22
[d. at 828.
23 See Commissioner v. Banks, 541 U.S. 958 (2004); Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, Banks, 125 S. Ct. 826 (2005) (No. 03-892), 2003 WL 23010681 at *7-8 (for
certiorari of Commissioner v. Banks, 345 F.3d 373 (6th Cir. 2003)); Petition for Writ
of Certiorari, Banks, 125 S. Ct. 826 (No. 03-907), 2003 WL 23055055 at *10 (for
certiorari of Banaitis v. Commissioner, 340 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2003)). Three circuits
had held that such amounts are not income to the plaintiff. Banks, 345 F.3d at 38286; Foster v. United States, 249 F.3d 1275, 1279-80 (11th Cir. 2001); Srivastava v.
Commissioner, 220 F.3d 353, 362--{55 (5th Cir. 2000). Conversely, three circuits had
held that such amounts are income to the plaintiff. Campbell v. Commissioner, 274
F.3d 1312, 1313-14 (10th Cir. 2001); Young v. Commissioner, 240 F.3d 369, 376-79
(4th Cir. 2001); O'Brien v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 707,712 (1962), affd per curiam,
319 F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1963). One circuit had held that whether such amounts are
income or not depends on the nature of the interest in the plaintiff's cause of action
(if any) granted to the plaintiff's attorney under state law. Banaitis, 340 F.3d at 108l.
Three circuits had held that such amounts are income without making clear whether
their decisions depended on the nature of the interest in the plaintiff's cause of action
granted to the plaintiff's attorney under state law. Raymond v. United States, 355
F.3d 107, 113-17 (2d Cir. 2004); Kenseth v. Commissioner, 259 F.3d 881, 883-84 (7th
19
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litigant's income includes the portion of the recovery paid to the
attorney as a contingent fee. ,,24
Even if the attorney-fee portion of the settlement is income to the
plaintiffs, these cases would not have arisen if the attorneys' fees had
25
been fully deductible by the plaintiffs. In that event, inclusion of the
contingent-fee amount would have been offset by deduction of the
same amount. Because of the offsetting inclusion and deduction of
the same item, the amount of the plaintiffs' taxable income (that is,
net income subject to taxation) would not have increased, nor would
their tax liability.
The Code, however, limits or denies the deduction of so-called
"miscellaneous itemized deductions,,,26 a category interpreted to
27
include the attorneys' fees of the plaintiffs in Banks and Banaitis.
Under the regular tax, miscellaneous itemized deductions are
available only to the extent that they exceed 2% of the taxpayer's
adjusted gross income,28 and even deduction of that excess amount
may be phased out if the taxpayer's adjusted gross income exceeds a
29
certain amount. Most important, miscellaneous itemized deductions
are not deductible at all under the Alternative Minimum Tax
(AMT),30 to which both Mr. Banks and Mr. Banaitis were subject. 31
There is general agreement that Congress never contemplated
that the miscellaneous itemized deduction category might encompass
32
the attorneys' fees of individuals like Mr. Banks and Mr. Banaitis.
Congress intended the category to include expenses that have
Cir. 2001); Baylin v. United States, 43 F.3d 1451, 1454-55 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
24 Banks, 125 S. Ct. at 829.
25 !d. at 830-3l.
26 Expenses that are not deductible in computing adjusted gross income under
section 62 are "itemized deductions." 1.R.e. § 63(d). Itemized deductions are
classified as "miscellaneous itemized deductions" unless specially exempted, and the
attorneys' fees in these cases are not among the exempted items. I.R.C. § 67(b).
27 Banks, 125 S. Ct. at 830. For the tax years in question, the attorneys' fees in
Banks and Banaitis were treated as not deductible in computing adjusted gross
income under section 62, and as a result, they were classified as "miscellaneous
itemized deductions." 1.R.e. §§ 63(d), 67(b).
28 1.R.e. § 67(a).
29 1.R.e. § 68.
30 IRe. § 56(b)(1)(A)(i).
31 Banks, 125 S. Ct. at 830.
32
See, e.g., Kenneth W. Gideon, An Interesting Time to Be a Tax Lawyer, 107
TAX NOTES 779, 780 (May 9, 2005).
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"characteristics of voluntary personal consumption expenditures.,,33
Nevertheless, miscellaneous itemized deductions were defined in such
general terms that the attorneys' fees in Banks and Banaitis, although
lacking any personal consumption element whatsoever, appear to
have been inadvertently swept in with other items that Congress
clearly intended to count as miscellaneous itemized deductions.
There is also consensus that the result of the Supreme Court's
34
decision in Banks and Banaitis is manifestly unfair. The plaintiffs are
taxed under the AMT on the entire recovery, including the attorneys'
fees. The overstatement of the plaintiffs' income leads to taxation at
excessively high rates. Although the highest marginal tax rate under
the AMT is 28%,35 Mr. Banks appears to be taxed on his actual share
of the settlement at an effective rate in excess of 40%,36 and Mr.

33 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION
OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, at 78 (Joint Comm. Print 1987). The quoted
passage explains the justification for section 67(a), which limits the deduction under
the regular tax for miscellaneous itemized deductions. Neither the Joint Committee
on Taxation nor the House and Senate reports explained the justification for
section 56(b)(1)(A)(i), which disallows a deduction entirely under the AMT for such
expenses. Id. at 7&-79; H.R. REP. No. 99-841, pt. 2, at 259-60 (1986); S. REP. No. 99313, at 535 (1986). It is, however, reasonable to assume that the justification for
section 67(a) applies to section 56(b )(1 )(A)(i) as well, since both provisions were
enacted at the same time as part of the same legislation. Tax Reform Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085, 2114, 2323-24.
34 See, e.g., Banks v. Commissioner, 345 F.3d 373, 385 (6th Cir. 2003)
(application of the assignment of income doctrine to attorneys' fees results in double
taxation); Sinyard v. Commissioner, 268 F.3d 756, 762-63 (9th Cir. 2001) (McKeown,
J., dissenting) (application of the assignment of income doctrine to attorneys' fees
could leave a victorious civil rights plaintiff with a net after-tax loss). The National
Taxpayer Advocate, an independent office established by Congress within the
Internal Revenue Service (Service), has listed the unfair treatment of attorneys' fees
as one of six major problem areas in the federal income tax. NAT'L TAXPAYER
ADVOCATE, FY 2002 ANNUAL REpORT TO CONGRESS, 156, 160-62 (2002).
35 1.R.c. § 55(b )(l)(A)(i)(II).
36 Assuming that Mr. Banks is married and has no other income or deductions,
his AMT income is the full $464,000 settlement amount since any exemptions are
phased out. Banks, 125 S. Ct. at 829; 1.R.c. § 55(d)(1)(B), (d)(3)(B). The first
$175,000 of AMT income above the exemption amount is taxed at a rate of 26%, and
any additional AMT income is taxed at a rate of 28%. 1.R.c. § 55(b)(1)(A)(i). The
tax due on the first $175,000 of AMT income is $45,500. The tax due on the $289,000
of additional AMT income is $80,920, and the total tax due under the AMT is
$126,420. The effective tax rate on the plaintiff's share ($314,000) is consequently
over 40%. Banks, 125 S. Ct. at 829.
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Banaitis appears to be taxed at an effective rate in excess of 50%.37
The plaintiff's effective tax rate depends on the ratio of the
attorneys' fees to the total recovery. As the ratio increases, so does
38
9
the plaintiff's effective tax rate. The ratio is 32% in Banki and 44%
in Banaitis,40 but in cases involving fee-shifting statutes, the ratio of
41
attorneys' fees to the total recovery may be much higher. If the ratio
is 72%, the Court's decision permits a confiscatory tax at an effective
rate of nearly 100%.42 If the ratio exceeds 72%, which is not only
possible in fee-shifting cases but also likely whenever the primary
31 Assuming that Mr. Banaitis is married and has no other income or deductions,
his AMT income is the entire $8,728,559 settlement amount since any exemptions are
phased out. Banks, 125 S. Ct. at 830; 1.R.c. § 55(d)(1)(B), (d)(3)(B). The first
$175,000 of AMT income above the exemption amount is taxed at a rate of 26%, and
any additional AMT income is taxed at a rate of 28%. I.R.C. § 55(b)(1)(A)(i). The
tax due on the first $175,000 of AMT income is $45,500. The tax due on the
additional $8,553,559 of AMT income is $2,394,997, and the total tax due under the
AMT is $2,440,497. The effective tax rate on the plaintiff's share ($4,864,547) is
consequently over 50%. Banks, 125 S. Ct. at 830.
38 Even if the proportion of the recovery going to attorneys' fees increases and
the plaintiff's share consequently falls, the plaintiff's tax liability under the AMT
remains constant because the entire attorney-fee portion is includible in the plaintiff's
AMT income without any off-setting deduction. See supra notes 36 and 37. If the
plaintiff's tax liability remains constant but the plaintiff's share of the recovery falls,
then the effective rate of tax on the plaintiff increases.
39 Mr. Banks paid his attorneys $150,000 of the $464,000 recovered. Banks, 125
S. Ct. at 829.
40 Mr. Banaitis paid his attorneys $3,864,012 of the $8,728,559 recovered. Id. at
830.
4\
In ordinary contingent-fee litigation, the attorney's fee is a percentage of the
total recovery. In fee-shifting cases, however, the fee does not come from the
plaintiff's recovery; rather, responsibility for payment of the fee is shifted to the
defendant, and the amount is determined by the court in a separate proceeding in
which the fee is calculated on the basis of what is a reasonable fee given the time and
effort involved. What constitutes a reasonable fee does not depend on the amount of
damages. Instead, "a reasonable attorney's fee is properly calculated by multiplying
the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation times a reasonable hourly
rate." Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886,888 (1984); see also City of Riverside v. Rivera,
477 U.S. 561, 576-79 (1986); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983); Quartino
v. Tiffany & Co., 166 F.3d 422, 426 (2d Cir. 1999).
42 Assume that the total recovery is $1 million, of which the attorney receives
$720,000 and the plaintiff receives $280,000. The tax due on the first $175,000 of
AMT income is $45,500. The tax due on the additional $825,000 of AMT income is
$231,000. 1.R.c. § 55(b)(1)(A)(i). Thus, under the AMT, the plaintiff's tax liability is
$276,500, nearly equal to the plaintiff's entire $280,000 share.
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remedy in a fee-shifting case is injunctive relief, the Court's decision
may cause the "successful" plaintiff to suffer an after-tax loss.
Shortly before oral argument in these cases, Congress enacted the
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (Jobs Act), which amended the
Code to permit plaintiffs to deduct fully the attorneys' fees in
specified categories of litigation, including a wide variety of civil rights
43
and employment cases. Because the Jobs Act amendment only has
prospective effect, however, it did not apply to Mr. Banks and Mr.
44
Banaitis. Moreover, the new provision effectively moots the Court's
decision in the future only for the kinds of litigation specified in the
45
legislation. The new provision therefore does not apply to other
categories of litigation, including nonphysical torts such as
defamation, physical torts involving punitive damages, and
46
environmental statutes with fee-shifting provisions.
For these
categories of cases, the Court's decision in Banks and Banaitis will
continue to have a harmful impact, causing plaintiffs to be taxed at
excessively high rates and undermining the objectives of other feeshifting provisions.
III. THE COURT DISTORTS FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES
A. Foundational Cases

Between 1930 and 1940, the Supreme Court articulated
foundational principles known as assignment of income law that help
47
Assignment of
determine the person to whom income is taxed.
income law originally evolved along two more or less distinct lines:
one concerned with income from labor and the other with income

43 Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418 (codified as amended in 26 U.S.c.).
Section 703 of the Act amended the Code by adding sections 62(a)(19) and (e). [d. at
1546--47.
44
See discussion supra note 12 and accompanying text.
45 See discussion supra note 11 and accompanying text.
46 See supra notes 13-15. The nonapplication of the Jobs Act will, of course, not
pose a problem in the unlikely event that attorneys' fees qualify as fully deductible
under one of the other categories listed in section 62, such as the trade or business
expenses of a self-employed taxpayer, the reimbursed trade or business expenses of
an employee, or the expenses of producing rent or royalty income. I.R.C. § 62(a)(1),
(a)(2)(A), (a)(4).
47 See generally BITIKER & LOKKEN, supra note 1, '[ 75.2.1.
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from property.48 The Court's first encounter with an assignment of
income question arose in 1930 in the case of Lucas v. Eari,49 which
involved labor income. Mr. Lucas, who worked as an attorney, made
a binding assignment by contract to his spouse, a housewife, of onehalf of all his future earnings. The issue was whether the assigned
labor income should be attributed and taxed to Mr. Lucas, the
assignor, who earned the assigned income. The Court held that labor
income is always taxable to the person who earns it, even if the
50
income is assigned to another.
When Lucas was decided, all taxpayers filed income tax returns as
individuals and there was no provision for married couples to file
jointly.51 Today, by filing a joint return, a taxpayer is able to cause
52
one-half of his or her income to be taxed to a spouse. Thus, the
availability of joint income tax filing for married couples produces the
result unsuccessfully sought by Mr. Lucas. Nevertheless, the Lucas
principle remains critical to preventing tax avoidance by individuals
with high marginal tax rates, who might otherwise assign their labor
income to related parties other than a spouse (such as minor children)
in order to take advantage of the assignees' lower marginal tax rates.
Even after the institution of joint returns, the Court continued to refer
to the Lucas principle, that labor income is taxed to the person who
performs services and earns such income, as "the first principle of
income taxation,,53 and as "the cornerstone of our graduated income
tax system. ,,54 The leading treatise on federal income taxation
describes the continuing influence and importance of Lucas:
Rarely has a judicial decision shaped an entire area of tax
practice as conclusively as Lucas v. Earl. It prevents ordinary
wage earners and salaried employees from assigning portions
of their earned income to members of their families, and it is
almost equally effective against similar assignments of selfemployed
persons
and
partners
engaged
In

48

49

50

Id. at 75-6 to -7.
281 U.S. 111 (1930).
Id. at 114-15.

n Congress did not provide for joint filing until 1948. See BITIKER & LOKKEN,

supra note 1, 'II 111.3.2.
52
I.R.C. § 6013. See generally BIlTKER & LOKKEN, supra note l.
53 Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 739-40 (1949).
54 United States v. Basye, 410 U.S. 441, 450 (1973).
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occupations ... such as the practice of law and medicine.

55

During the decade after its decision in Lucas, the Court also
developed principles for determining the person to whom property
56
income should be attributed and taxed.
The Court had two
competing objectives to balance: on the one hand, as in Lucas,
preventing a high marginal rate taxpayer from assigning income for
tax purposes to a party in a lower tax bracket; on the other hand,
avoiding the imposition of unreasonable impediments to the free
transfer of property, as would exist if an assignor of property were
taxable on the property income even after a bona fide assignment of
the property to another.
While adopting the perhaps obvious answer that property income
should be taxed to the owner, the Court was careful to require that
ownership be determined on the basis of economic realities rather
than legal formalities. Thus, for example, in 1930 in Corliss v.
Bowers,57 the Court held that an individual who transfers property to a
trust but retains the legal power to revoke the trust is treated as owner
of the property for tax purposes and is therefore taxed on the
property income even though he has relinquished formal legal title.
Similarly, in a landmark 1940 case, Helvering v. Horst,58 the Court
reiterated the principle that property income is to be taxed to the
person who controls the property, even if the right to the income is
assigned to another person. Mr. Horst owned a bond with the right to
receive periodic interest. Shortly before an interest payment date, he
transferred to his son the right to receive that period's interest
payment. The question was whether Mr. Horst should report the
interest income that was assigned and paid to his son. In holding that
the interest income should be taxed to Mr. Horst, the Court
emphasized that he retained control over the property (the bond) that
was the source of the interest income. Therefore, under the principle
that the person controlling an asset is taxable on the income produced
by the asset, Mr. Horst had to treat the interest as his income.

55

BIlTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 1, at 75-10.
See Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579 (1941); Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S.
331 (1940); Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940); Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5
(1937); Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376 (1930).
57 281 U.S. 376, 377-78 (1930).
58 311 U.S. 112, 116-17 (1940).
56
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B. The Court Misapplies Lucas and Horst

In Banks and Banaitis, the Court concludes that the assignment of
income law principles of Lucas and Horst require a litigant to report
as income the portion of a settlement paid to an attorney as a
contingent fee. The issue, the Court states, is:
[W]hether the assignor retains dominion over the incomegenerating asset, because the taxpayer "who owns or controls
the source of the income, also controls the disposition of that
which he could have received himself and diverts the payment
from himself to others as the means of procuring the
satisfaction of his wants." [citing Horst and Lucas] ...
In the case of a litigation recovery the income-generating
asset is the cause of action that derives from the plaintiff's
legal injury. The plaintiff retains dominion over this asset
59
throughout the litigation.
It may be helpful to restate the Court's reasoning as a syllogism:

(1) The income in these cases, consisting of the settlement,
was the product of an asset, namely the cause of action.
(2) Income from an asset is taxed to the person who controls
the asset under the assignment of income principles of
Lucas and Horst.
(3) The plaintiff retained control over the asset.
(4) Therefore, the plaintiff must report all the income from
the asset under the assignment of income principles of
Lucas and Horst.
The Court treats the recovery in each case as entirely the product
of an asset, the cause of action, and ignores the contribution of
services made by the plaintiff's attorney. As a matter of economics,
however, the settlement in these cases is obviously the product of two
separate factors of production. One factor is labor, consisting of legal
services, contributed by the plaintiff's attorney. The other factor is an
asset, consisting of the cause of action, contributed by the plaintiff.
59

Commissioner v. Banks, 125 S. Ct. 826, 831-32 (2005) (emphasis added).
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The attorney-fee portion of the settlement compensates the attorney
for the contribution of his legal services and therefore is the economic
return to (that is, the amount earned by) the attorney's services. The
plaintiff's portion of the settlement compensates the plaintiff for the
contribution of his asset (the cause of action) and therefore is the
economic return to (that is, the amount earned by) the asset.
Once the settlement is characterized as the product of two factors,
with the attorney-fee portion constituting the economic return to the
attorney's labor and the plaintiff's portion of the settlement
constituting the economic return to the cause of action, neither Lucas
nor Horst can justify taxing the attorney-fee portion to the plaintiff.
Assignment of income principles are irrelevant since the attorney's fee
is compensation neither for labor provided by the plaintiff in
connection with the litigation (so that Lucas applies), nor for an asset
provided by the plaintiff in connection with the litigation (so that
Horst applies). If the Court's holding - that the attorney's fee is
income to the plaintiff - is to be justified, it must be under some
other theory.
The following examples may help distinguish instances in which
assignment of income principles do apply to contingent fees from
cases like Banks and Banaitis and in which the assignment of income
principles of Lucas and Horst are irrelevant.
Example #1 - A contingent-fee agreement provides that the
attorney, who is the plaintiff's child, will receive 70% of any
recovery. If the contingent-fee agreement was negotiated
between two unrelated parties dealing at arms' length, it
would provide for the attorney to receive only 40% of any
recovery. Because the parent and child are related parties
and because the contingent fee exceeds what would be paid
under an arms' length deal, the fees in excess of 40% of the
recovery presumably do not represent compensation for the
services of the attorney and are income attributable to the
cause of action, which is the property of the plaintiff.
Therefore, the plaintiff must report the excess fees as income
from the asset.
Example #2 - A plaintiff signs an agreement assigning 20%
of any recovery to a hospital to which the plaintiff owes a
debt for medical care.
Because the hospital has not
contributed property or services to the conduct of the
litigation, the amount paid to the hospital cannot represent
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compensation for either property or labor contributed to the
litigation activity. The payment to the hospital liquidates a
debt owed by the plaintiff and presumably represents an
assignment by the plaintiff of income attributable to the cause
of action, which is the property of the plaintiff. Therefore,
the plaintiff must report that amount as income.
Example #3 - A contingent-fee agreement provides that the
attorney will receive 40% and that the plaintiff will receive
60% of any recovery. The attorney and the plaintiff are
unrelated parties, dealing at arms' length. If there is a
recovery, the 40% paid to the attorney represents
compensation for the attorney's labor and the 60% paid to
the plaintiff represents income attributable to the cause of
action, which is the property of the plaintiff. Therefore,
assignment of income principles should not require the
plaintiff to report the amount paid to the attorney.
C. Why and How Did the Court Go Wrong?

Why does the Court insist on characterizing the settlement as the
product solely of an asset consisting of the cause of action and refuse
to view the settlement as the product jointly of that asset and the
personal services of the attorney, particularly when the briefs for the
respondents forcefully pressed that view?60
The Solicitor General's Reply Brief made two arguments against
the characterization of the settlement as the joint product of an asset
(consisting of the plaintiff's cause of action) and the services of the
attorney:
First, respondents ignore the fact that the legal right to
recover damages arises at the time of the actionable injury,
not when that right is subsequently reduced to judgment with
(or without) the assistance of an attorney. Under the law, a
plaintiff's right to income is complete when an actionable
injury is suffered, because it is the injury that gives rise to the
cause of action and provides the measure of the damages
recovery to which the plaintiff is entitled. To be sure, an
60 Brief of Respondent Banks at *10, *15, 2004 WL 1876293; Brief of
Respondent Banaitis at *5-9, 2004 WL 1835368.
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attorney's services may help enforce that income entitlement,
but the attorney does not earn the damages award; the
plaintiff had already "earned" his or her entitlement to that
award by suffering injury before the attorney even appeared
on the scene. What the attorney "earns" is merely the right
to be paid for services rendered.
Second, the factual premise of respondents' argument-that
they could not have recovered on their causes of action
absent the services of their attorneys-is pure speculation.
Many litigants successfully represent themselves, and there is
no basis to determine from the record in these cases whether
respondents could have achieved the same or similar
recoveries had they represented themselves. 61
The Court does not mention these arguments in its opinion, and it is
difficult to believe that the Court took either argument seriously. The
government's first argument is irrelevant. The critical question is not
when the right to sue arises but rather what factors of production
produce the recovery. Clearly, there are two factors involved: the
plaintiff's cause of action and the attorney's services.
The government's second argument defies belief and common
sense. As the brief for Mr. Banaitis noted:
After years of intensive litigation, with repeated motions,
extensive discovery, a lengthy trial, and two appeals, the
defendants agreed to settle the case for $8,728,559. It defies
reality to assert, as the government does, that only
respondent earned that money. The Commissioner does not
suggest that the defendants in this case, from the day they
dismissed respondent in 1987, wanted to pay him more than
$8 million in back pay and damages, were somehow unable to
find him for eight years, and then spontaneously produced the
check in 1995 when they happened to encounter him in an
Oregon courthouse.... If the attorney representing
respondent had not invested hundreds or thousands of hours
of his time working on this case, respondent would have
. d noth·mg. 62
receIve

61
62

Reply Brief of Petitioner at *7,2004 WL 2190372.
Brief of Respondent Banaitis, supra note 60, at *10-11.
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Moreover, during oral argument, at least Justice Souter indicated that
he understood the flaw in the government's position that the entire
recovery had already been earned at the time when the right to sue
arose:
JUSTICE SOUTER [addressing the government's attorney]:
Mr. Salmons, doesn't the plausibility of your argument here
rest on the assumption that what the-that the cause of action
at the time the-that the plaintiff made the agreement with
the lawyer is a cause of action which has the same value as the
ultimate recovery that the lawyer gets? Whereas, in fact, the
cause of action at the time of the agreement with the lawyer
has an inchoate value. The - the value that is actually
realized is going to depend in part on the - on the skill andand the - the gumption of the lawyer ....
. . . [I]t seems to me that the value realized as opposed to the
right to sue are two different figures. And I don't see
realistically how the client has complete control over the
value realized, which we don't even know until the lawyer has
63
done his work and gotten the check.
It is possible that the Court may have doubted whether

characterizing the recovery as a joint product distinguishes Banks and
Banaitis from Lucas. During oral argument, Justice Ginsburg asked
why, if the settlements in Banks and Banaitis were joint products (of
the plaintiff's cause of action and the attorney's services), the earnings
of the attorney in Lucas were not also the joint product of the
husband (who worked as an attorney) and his wife (who provided the
husband with household services).
MR. CARTY [counsel for Banks]: [I]n Lucas v. Earl, it was
the assignor who earned the income that was subject to
disposition. Here JUSTICE GINSBURG: I'm not so sure about that because
why doesn't the theory that-that applies to the lawyer [in
Banks and Banaitis] equally apply to the wife [in Lucas]? I
mean, she took care of everything going on at home, and that
enabled him to go out there and make all that money. So
63

Transcript of Oral Argument at *18, 2004 WL 2513558.
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without her services, just like without the lawyer's services MR. CARTY: That is an excellent point, Your Honor.64
Rather than conceding the point, Mr. Carty might have
distinguished Lucas from Banks and Banaitis. Even if Mrs. Lucas
contributed to her husband's well-being, she did not contribute either
assets or services to the activity of the practice of law for which he was
compensated. The compensation that Mr. Lucas received for his legal
services is still the economic return to (the amount earned by) his
labor. Therefore, when he assigned a portion of that compensation to
his wife, he was assigning income that he would earn. On the other
hand, in Banks and Banaitis, the portion of the settlement retained by
the plaintiff is the entire economic return to (that is, the entire amount
earned by) the asset consisting of the cause of action. The attorneyfee portion is not earned either by the asset or by services contributed
by the plaintiff, but by the attorneys who performed litigation
services, whereas Mr. Lucas actually earned the compensation that he
sought to assign to his wife.
The attorneys for Mr. Banks and Mr. Banaitis may also have
weakened their position by attempting to distinguish Lucas and Horst
on grounds that are clearly wrong. Briefs for the respondents
emphasized that in their cases, unlike Lucas and Horst, (1) there was
no tax avoidance purpose,65 (2) the contingent-fee agreement was an
arms' length transaction between independent parties who were not
family members,66 and (3) the contingent-fee agreement conveyed no
67
more than a mere expectancy of future income.
The Supreme Court had previously declared that the assignment
of income doctrine could be applied notwithstanding these three
factors. In Lucas, for example, the Court flatly stated that the
presence or absence of a tax avoidance motive was irrelevant since it
68
was too difficult to ascertain.
Moreover, Lucas involved a mere
Id. at *52-53.
65 Brief of Respondent Banks, supra note 60, at *24; Brief of Respondent
Banaitis, supra note 60, at *23.
66 Brief of Respondent Banks, supra note 60, at *24; Brief of Respondent
Banaitis, supra note 60, at *22-23.
67 Brief of Respondent Banks, supra note 60, at *13; Brief of Respondent
Banaitis, supra note 60, at *24.
68 281 U.S. 111, 115 (1930). It was in 1901 that Mr. Lucas signed the contract
providing his wife with the right to one-half of his earnings. In its opinion in Banks
64
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expectancy, since the assignment was made two decades before Mr.
Lucas earned the income in question. In addition, while the
assignments in both Lucas and Horst were to family members, the
Court clearly contemplated that the assignment of income doctrine
could apply to an arms' length assignment to a third party. The
opinion in Horst, for example, stated that the owner of the bond
would be taxable on the interest if he assigned it to a grocer in
69
satisfaction of a debt for groceries.
In its opinion in Banks and Banaitis, the Court explicitly rejects
the respondents' arguments that either the absence of a tax avoidance
purpose or the conveyance of a mere expectancy distinguished their
7o
Thus, the respondents may have
cases from Lucas and Horst.
lessened their chances for success by attempting to distinguish Banks
and Banaitis on invalid grounds. The respondents' clearly incorrect
arguments may have distracted the Court from focusing on the valid
distinction: that the income was the joint product of the asset
contributed by the plaintiff and the services contributed by the
attorney, whereas in Lucas, the income was entirely earned by Mr.
Lucas, and in Horst, the interest income was entirely the return on the
father's bond.
In rejecting the characterization of the recovery in each case as
the joint product of the plaintiff's asset and the attorney's services and
focusing instead on the question of who controlled the cause of action,
the Court may also be mistakenly responding to a theory articulated

and Banaitis, the Court assumes that Mr. Lucas could not have had a tax avoidance
purpose at that time, since the federal income tax only became law in 1913 after
enactment of the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution. During oral argument,
Justice Scalia pressed the attorney for Mr. Banaitis on this point:
JUSTICE SCALIA: There was no avoidance motive in the MR. JONES: Yes.
JUSTICE SCALIA:-granddaddy of all cases. The assignment there,
although it was between family members, had been made before there was
an income tax.
MR. JONES: But we must JUSTICE SCALIA: The income tax didn't exist. There-there couldn't
conceivably have been an avoidance motive. So-so our holding could
hardly be based upon - upon the existence of an avoidance motive.
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 63, at *35-36.
69 311 U.S. 112, 117 (1940).
70 Commissioner v. Banks, 125 S. Ct. 826,831-32 (2005).
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1

by the Courts of Appeals in Bank/ and Banaitis,n which was
repeated in the briefs for the respondents. Both Courts of Appeals
construed the contingent-fee agreements as transferring ownership of
part of the cause of action to the attorney.73 Under this reasoning, for
example, a contingent-fee agreement guaranteeing the attorney the
right to one-third of any recovery transfers ownership to the attorney
of a one-third interest in the asset in question, the cause of action,
with the plaintiff retaining two-thirds of the asset. Consequently,
assignment of income principles do not require the plaintiff to report
the attorney-fee portion of the settlement. That portion, according to
the Courts of Appeals in Banks and Banaitis, was income earned by
an asset that the plaintiff no longer owned and which, at the time of
the settlement, was owned by the plaintiff's attorney. The Supreme
Court reaches the contrary conclusion that the plaintiff should be
treated as owning the entire asset consisting of the cause of action
because "[t]he plaintiff retains dominion over this asset throughout
the litigation.,,74 Therefore, under the Horst principle - that the
person who controls an asset is taxed on the asset's income - the
Court holds that the plaintiff must report the entire recovery,
75
including the portion devoted to attorney's fee. The Court, however,
fails to consider that even if the plaintiff effectively retained the entire
asset, the plaintiff's return on (the amount earned by) the asset
consisted of the plaintiff's share of the settlement and no more. Thus,
whether the contingent fee is characterized as the economic return on
a portion of the asset transferred to the attorneys under the
contingent-fee agreement (as the Courts of Appeals held in Banks
and Banaitis) or as the economic return to the attorneys' services, it is
not the economic return for either the plaintiff's services or an asset
owned by the plaintiff.
IV. ATTRIBUTING INCOME FROM JOINT PRODUCTION

As the preceding section indicates, foundational principles of
assignment of income law, as articulated in Lucas and Horst, do not
justify the Supreme Court's holding that "the litigant's income
71

72
73

74
75

Banks v. Commissioner, 345 F.3d 373 (6th Cir. 2003).
Banaitis v. Commissioner, 340 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2003).
Banks, 345 F.3d at 383-86; Banaitis, 340 F.3d at 1081-83.
Banks, 125 S. Ct. at 832.
Id. at 832-33.
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includes the portion of the recovery paid to the attorney as a
contingent fee.,,76 Instead of applying assignment of income law
principles, the Court should have analyzed the cases of Mr. Banks and
Mr. Banaitis as involving the question of how income should be
reported when it is the joint product of assets and/or services
contributed by two or more parties to a common venture with a view
to sharing the profits.
A. Does the Contingent Fee Create a Partnership?
If joint producers create a partnership to conduct a common

venture under Subchapter K of the Code, then each joint producer
will be taxed only on that producer's proportionate share of the
77
income. Consequently, the brief for Mr. Banaitis argued that the
contingent-fee agreement should be treated as creating a partnership
for federal income tax purposes so that Mr. Banaitis would be taxed
78
on his share of the recovery but no more. In its opinion, however,
the Court cites the principal-agent character of the attorney-client
relationship as the reason for not treating the contingent-fee
arrangement as a partnership:
We ... reject the suggestion to treat the attorney-client
relationship as a sort of business partnership or joint venture
for tax purposes. The relationship between client and
attorney, regardless of the vanatlons in particular
compensation agreements or the amount of skill and effort
the attorney contributes, is a quintessential principal-agent
relationship. The client may rely on the attorney's expertise
and special skills to achieve a result the client could not
achieve alone. That, however, is true of most principal-agent
relationships ....
The attorney is an agent who is duty bound to act only in the
interests of the principal, and so it is appropriate to treat the
79
full amount of the recovery as income to the principal.

76

Id. at 829.

77

I.R.C. § 701 et seq.
Brief of Respondent Banaitis, supra note 60, at *5-13.
79 Banks, 125 S. Ct. at 832-33 (internal citations omitted).
After explicitly
rejecting the respondents' suggestion that the contingent-fee agreement be treated as
78
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The opinion does not explain why the nature of the duties owed
by the attorney to the client under state law should affect whether the
contingent-fee agreement should be treated as creating a partnership
for federal tax purposes. The Court simply asserts that such duties
matter, referring to the fact that the law of every state prohibits a
lawyer from entering an actual partnership with a client whom the
80
lawyer represents. The reference to actual partnerships under state
law nevertheless implies an explanation: since virtually every state law
prohibits such partnerships, the contingent-fee agreement should not
be treated as creating a partnership for federal income tax purposes.
This explanation, however, contradicts long-established law and
practice. The Court has previously stated that whether a partnership
exists for purposes of state law does not determine whether a
81
partnership exists for purposes of federal taxation. As the leading
treatise on partnership taxation notes:
Whether a joint enterprise is a partnership at common law or
under state partnership statutes is not determinative of its
status for income tax purposes. Therefore, an enterprise may
be classified as a partnership for tax purposes even though it
is not, or could not be, a partnership under a state partnership
statute. Conversely, the fact that a joint enterprise is a

a partnership, the Court bizarrely claims that it is in fact not deciding the partnership
issue:
Respondents and their amici propose other theories to exclude fees from
income or permit deductibility. These suggestions include: (1) The
contingent-fee agreement establishes a Subchapter K partnership ....
These arguments, it appears, are being presented for the first time to this
Court. We are especially reluctant to entertain novel propositions of law
with broad implications for the tax system that were not advanced in earlier
stages of the litigation and not examined by the Courts of Appeals. We
decline comment on these supplementary theories.
Id. at 833.
80 Id.
Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280, 288 (1946) (holding Michigan law
cannot determine partnership status for purposes of federal income tax law); see also
Nichols v. Commissioner, 32 T.e. 1322, 1330 (1959) (acq.) (holding partnership for
federal income tax purposes existed between physician and his nonphysician wife,
even though prohibited under state law); Rev. Rul. 77-332, 1977-2 C.B. 484 (holding
partnership for federal income tax purposes existed between CPA and non-CPAs,
even though prohibited by state law).
8!
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partnership under state law is not dispositive of its
82
classification for federal income tax purposes.
A more substantial reason for not treating a contingent-fee
agreement as creating a partnership for federal tax purposes is that
the venture would then be subject to the extremely detailed and
complex rules and requirements of Subchapter K of the Code.83 As
one commentator has noted, "contingent-fee contracts are quite
common, and to convert every contingent-fee contract in the economy
into the equivalent of a tax partnership would be to severely
complicate common economic arrangements.,,84
In any event, a decision not to classify the contingent-fee
agreement as a partnership, for whatever reason, does not by itself
resolve the question before the Court in these cases. True, a decision
to classify the agreement as a partnership would have meant that Mr.
Banks and Mr. Banaitis should report as income only their shares of
the recovery, exclusive of the contingent fee. The converse, however,
is not true. A decision not to classify the agreement as a partnership
still leaves the question before the Court unanswered. Such a decision
does not tell us whether the plaintiff should report as income the
contingent-fee portion of the recovery.
B. Distinctions Among Informal Profit-Sharing Activities

During oral argument, the Justices made no mention whatsoever
of the principal-agent character of the attorney-client relationship as
the reason for not treating the contingent-fee arrangement as a
partnership.85 The Justices, however, repeatedly suggested that the
result sought by Mr. Banks and Mr. Banaitis - taxing the plaintiff on
his share of the recovery but no more - would create arbitrary
86
differences among similarly situated taxpayers.
Taxpayers often contribute property and/or services to a common
venture with a view to sharing profits but without creating a

1 WILLIAM S. McKEE ET AL., FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND
PARTNERS 3-5 (3d ed. 2005) (emphasis added).
83 1.R.c. § 701 et seq.
82

84 Deborah A. Geier, Some Meandering Thoughts on Plaintiffs and Their
Attorneys' Fees and Costs, 88 TAX NOTES 531, 539 (July 24, 2000).
85 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 63.
86 Id. at *3~32, *36-37.
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87

partnership for federal tax purposes.
Such arrangements can be
described as informal profit-sharing activities. They are informal
because the parties are not treated as creating a partnership (or other
separate entity) for federal tax purposes. They involve profit-sharing
because the parties pool property and services and agree to share
profits. Consider three examples of such informal profit-sharing
activities:
Example #4 - A, an owner of farmland, and B, a tenant
farmer, agree that B may grow crops on the land and sell
them, with 30% of the proceeds going to A and 70% going to
B.

Example #5 - C, a plaintiff with a cause of action, and D, an
attorney, sign a contingent-fee agreement under which D will
litigate C's cause of action, with two-thirds of any recovery
going to C, and one-third going to D.
Example #6 - E, an author, and F, a literary agent, agree
that F will sell the rights to E's books to a publisher, with
80% of the proceeds going to E and 20% going to F.
In Example #4 (landowner and tenant farmer), the Internal
Revenue Service (Service) takes the position that each profit-sharing
joint producer reports as income his or her respective share of the
proceeds. Neither joint producer must report the entire amount of
88
the proceeds as income.
In Examples #5 and #6, however, the
Service takes the position that the plaintiff and the author respectively
must report the entire proceeds as income and then deduct payments
89
to the attorney and literary agent to the extent permitted.
What are the criteria used by the Service to determine how to
treat these three examples of informal profit-sharing activities? There
is no Code rule, Treasury regulation, or other official pronouncement

P!I See generally McKEE ET AL., supra note 82, at 3-24 ("There is, however, a
wide variety of economic arrangements that are not partnerships, but that involve the
cooperative commitment of capital and services with a view to making a profit or
achieving some gainful economic objective.").
88 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE PUBLICATION 225, FARMER'S TAX GUIDE 78
(2005).
89 Brief of Petitioner at *24, 2004 WL 1330104; Reply Brief of Petitioner, supra
note 61, at *8-9.
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on point. The statute - the Internal Revenue Code - is entirely
silent on this question. The Treasury has not issued regulations
providing guidance. Nor has the Service issued a ruling explaining
when it is likely to allow each joint producer to report his or her
contractual share of the proceeds and when it will require one of the
joint producers to report the entire amount and then deduct payments
to the other producer to the extent permitted. The Service appears to
make judgments about how to treat such activities on a purely ad hoc
basis.
Much of the time, the decision how to treat such informal profitsharing activities will not matter, because even if one party is required
to report all the proceeds of the joint production activity as income,
the party will be entitled to fully offsetting deductions for payments
that compensate other parties for their contributions. Thus, for
example, assuming that the author in Example #6 is self-employed, he
will be able to deduct the literary agent's fee without limit because the
miscellaneous itemized deduction category does not include the
90
business expenses of self-employed persons.
The issue becomes
important, however, in cases like Banks and Banaitis, in which the
expense is classified as a miscellaneous itemized deduction so that the
deduction is limited under the regular tax and not available at all
under the AMT.
For this reason, Mr. Banks and Mr. Banaitis argued that they
should be treated like the landowner in Example #4 rather than like
91
the author in Example #6. In making this argument, they followed
Tax Court Judge Renato Beghe, who had earlier argued in an
92
emphatic dissent in Kenseth v. Commissioner that the plaintiff and
attorney with a contingent-fee agreement in Example #5 are like the
landowner and the tenant farmer in Example #4:
One way to think of the contingent fee agreement ... is to
analogize it to a cropsharing arrangement. Cropsharing is
strikingly similar to the contingent fee agreement. The
attorney is in the position of the tenant farmer, who bears all
his direct and overhead expenses incurred in earning the
contingent fee (and the contingent fees under all such
1.R.e. § 62(a)(1).
91 See generally Brief of Respondent Banks, supra note 60; Brief of Respondent
Banaitis, supra note 60.
92 114 T.e. 399 (2000).
90
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arrangements to which he is a party with other clients). The
client is in the position of the landowner ... who bears none
of the operating expenses, but is responsible for paying the
carrying charges on his land, such as mortgage interest and
real estate taxes. These charges are analogous to court costs,
which the client under a contingent fee agreement is usually
responsible for, and which the attorney can only advance to
or on behalf of the client ....
. . . [C]ropsharing arrangements result in a division of the
crops and the total gross revenue from their sale in the
agreed-upon percentages. This income is characterized as
rental income to the owner or lessee of the land and farm
income to the tenant-farmer.
The analogy of contingent fee agreements to cropsharing
arrangements is suggestive and helpful. It solves the problem
under the attorney's ethics rule that says the attorney is not
supposed to acquire an ownership interest in the cause of
action that is the subject of such an agreement. The client,
like the owner or lessee of farmland who rents it to the
tenant-farmer, transfers to the attorney an interest in the
recovery that is analogous to the tenant-farmer's share of the
crop generated by his farming activities on the land leased or
made available to him by the nonactive owner. ...93
During oral argument, the Justices incorrectly suggested that the
position of the respondents would draw arbitrary lines in the
treatment of informal profit-sharing activities, while the position of
the government would not. The Justices repeatedly pressed the
attorneys for Mr. Banks and Mr. Banaitis to defend the arbitrary
difference in treatment, which a decision for the respondents would
create, between the contingent-fee plaintiff in Example #5 and the
94
author in Example #6. The Justices did not mention, however, that
the government's position would cause an arbitrary difference in
treatment between the landowner in Example #4 and the contingentId. at 454-55 (Beghe, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 63, at *31-32. When both Justices
Kennedy and Breyer pushed the attorney for Mr. Banaitis to articulate a principled
basis for distinguishing between the contingent-fee plaintiff in Example #5 and the
author in Example #6, the attorney tried to change the subject. Id. at *31-33.
93

94
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fee plaintiff and author in Examples #5 and #6. The Justices thus
failed to acknowledge that the position of the government, no less
than the position of the respondents, draws arbitrary lines.
In fact, under ordinary and usual principles of taxation, the
landowner, plaintiff, and author in Examples #4, #5, and #6 should all
be treated the same, with each having to report only his or her share
of the proceeds as gross income under section 61(a). Under these
principles, it is either legal entitlement or economic benefit that
95
usually triggers income taxation. A taxpayer must report amounts to
which the taxpayer is legally entitled or from which the taxpayer
benefits economically. Conversely, a taxpayer ordinarily need not
report as income an amount to which the taxpayer is not legally
entitled and from which the taxpayer does not benefit economically.96
In Example #5, by virtue of the contingent-fee agreement, the
plaintiff is not legally entitled to and does not benefit economically
from the attorney's share of the proceeds. Therefore, the plaintiff
should have to report only his or her share of the proceeds as gross
income under section 61(a) and should not have to report the
attorney's share. Similarly, the landowner in Example #4 and the
author in Example #6 are neither legally entitled to nor economically
benefited from the share of the proceeds going to the farmer and
agent respectively and therefore should not have to report those
amounts as gross income under section 61(a).97
There are, of course, exceptions to these principles, under which a
taxpayer may have to report income to which the taxpayer is not

95 See, e.g., N. Am. Oil Consol. v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417, 423-24 (1932) (holding
that taxpayer should not report income from property in 1916 when taxpayer's right
to the income was contested and the income was paid to a receiver instead of the
taxpayer but that taxpayer should report the income in 1917 when a court terminated
the receivership and the taxpayer became entitled to the income); United States v.
Drescher, 179 F.2d 863, 865-66 (2d Cir. 1950) (holding that a taxpayer must report as
gross income the economic benefit of a nontransferable annuity purchased for the
taxpayer by his employer).
96 N. Am. Oil Consol., 286 U.S. at 423-24; Drescher, 179 F.2d at 865-66.
97 It is true that in these examples, each co-producer benefits from the
contribution of the other co-producer. Nevertheless, the benefit conferred by coproducers on each other in joint production activities does not and should not
constitute a separate item of gross income, in addition to each co-producer's
contractual share. To illustrate, in example #4, the tenant farmer benefits from the
use of the land, and the landowner benefits from the tenant's labor. Yet neither
reports such benefit as a separate additional item of income.
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entitled and from which the taxpayer does not benefit economically.
In Lucas ,98 for example, despite the lack of entitlement or benefit, the
9
husband is taxed because the income is earned by him. In Horst/
despite the lack of entitlement or benefit when the interest is paid, the
father is taxed because the income is earned by property that he
controls. For reasons explained in Part II above, however, neither of
those exceptions applies to Examples #4, #5, and #6 (or to the facts of
Banks or Banaitis).
C. Contingent Versus Hourly Fees

Questioning the attorney for Mr. Banaitis during oral argument,
the Justices also seemed troubled by another distinction - between
the plaintiff who enters a contingent-fee agreement and the plaintiff
who pays the attorney an hourly rate.
JUSTICE STEVENS: Yes, but what if you had the same
result but-in terms of the sharing of the expense and the
recovery, but it was computed on an hourly basis rather than
a percentage basis? Would that produce a different result?l°O
As the questioning implies, had Mr. Banks or Mr. Banaitis paid
the attorneys an hourly rate, the portion of the settlement paid to the
plaintiffs' attorneys would presumably have to be reported as income
by the plaintiffs. Therefore, the Court was asking, wouldn't the
position of respondents create a second arbitrary difference between
plaintiffs paying their attorneys a contingent fee (who would only
report as income their recovery net of attorneys' fees) and plaintiffs
paying their attorneys by the hour (who would be obligated to report
their entire recovery as income)?
Although a distinction between profit-sharing payments that bear
the risk of a venture and fixed payments would result, this distinction
is already embedded in current tax law and practice. Return to
Example #4 above - if the tenant pays the landowner a fixed rent
(analogous to the plaintiff paying the attorney by the hour), then the
tenant presumably must report the entire proceeds of selling the crops
as income and take a deduction for the rent paid.

98
99

100

281 U.S. 111 (1930).
311 U.S. 112 (1940).

Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 63, at *36.
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An Amicus brief proposed an alternative theory that would have
permitted a decision for Mr. Banks and Mr. Banaitis while at the same
101
time treating alike both contingent-fee and hourly fee plaintiffs.
The brief argued that the attorneys' fees should be capitalized, that is,
treated as the cost of acquiring and disposing of an asset consisting of
102
the cause of action. In that event, under longstanding provisions of
the Code, the taxpayer would report as income only the difference
between the amount realized from the asset (which is the recovery)
3
and the asset's cost consisting of the attorneys' fees.10 Whether the
plaintiff pays a contingent fee or by the hour, the capitalization
argument treats the payment as a cost of an asset so that the plaintiff
reports as income only the difference between the total recovery from
the asset and the asset's cost. During oral argument, the Justices
repeatedly asked questions regarding the capitalization rationale,
giving the impression that the Court might adopt this theory as a basis
104
for decision. The Court's opinion, however, states simply that it was
not reaching the merits of the capitalization argument since it had not
105
been considered by the courts below.
Of course, had the Court
adopted the capitalization approach, it could have eliminated any
106
differences in the treatment of contingent and hourly fees.
To sum up, the difficulty of drawing principled distinctions (either
between different kinds of informal profit-sharing activities or
between payment according to a profit percentage and a fixed rate)
cannot justify the Court's holding in Banks and Banaitis. Although
during oral argument, the Justices repeatedly expressed concern that a

101 Brief for Prof. Charles Davenport as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents,
2004 WL 1860016.
102 !d. at *5-10.
103 1.R.c. §§ 61(a)(3), 1001(a).
104
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 63, at *12-13, *21-22, *27, *41-42.
105 Commissioner v. Banks, 125 S. Ct. 826, 833 (2005).
106
The proposed capitalization treatment of legal fees as the cost of a recovery
parallels the actual treatment of the manufacturer or merchandiser of inventory under
Treas. Reg. § 1.61-3(a), in conjunction with the capitalization rule of section 263A.
The regulation provides that "[i]n a manufacturing [and] merchandising ... business,
'gross income' means the total sales, less the cost of goods sold .... " Under
section 263A, the salary and raw material costs of manufacturing or merchandising
inventory are capitalized as part of the cost of inventory. Thus, the manufacturer or
merchandiser would include in gross income under section 61(a) only the receipts
from selling inventory less their cost. I am grateful to Professor Bernard Wolfman for
suggesting this analogy.
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decision for the respondents would create arbitrary distinctions, the
Court's opinion does not mention this problem as a reason for its
holding. Perhaps, on reflection, the Justices recognized that arbitrary
lines would persist even if they decided for the government and
therefore omitted that consideration in their published opinion.
V. THE RELEVANCE OF FEE-SHIFTING STATUTES

A. Conflict Between Tax Law and Fee-Shifting Statutes

Even if the Court's holding - that the plaintiff must report as
income the portion of a recovery paid as a contingent fee - is correct
purely as a matter of tax law standing alone, the decision nevertheless
undermines the fee-shifting provisions of federal statutes, which
permit a prevailing plaintiff to recover attorneys' fees from the
defendant. The purpose of the fee-shifting statutes is to enable the
plaintiff who cannot pay an attorney to act as a "private attorney
general"l07 vindicating national policy. Therefore, Congress has
provided for the prevailing plaintiff in specified categories of litigation
to recover not only damages, but also a reasonable amount to pay for
.
f
~
th e serVIces
0 an attorney.
Taxing the plaintiff on the attorney-fee portion of a recovery,
however, negates the objective of the fee-shifting statutes, which is to
permit plaintiffs "to employ ... lawyers without cost to themselves if
they prevail. ,,109 When the damages are modest compared to the
attorneys' fees, the Court's decision will result in the plaintiff retaining
little or none of the damages after paying taxes on the gross recovery,
which includes the attorneys' fees as well as the damages. In some
cases, the "successful" plaintiff may even suffer a net loss because the
tax liability will exceed the damages received.
A New York Times article provides a striking example of such a
110
case.
The article discusses Spina v. Forest Pres. Dist. of Cook
County.111 In Spina, a police officer who sued her employer for sex
107 Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 894 n.10 (1984); Christiansburg Garment Co. v.
EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 416 (1978); Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402
(1968).
108
See supra notes 6 and 15.
109 Venegas v. Mitchell, 495 U.S. 82, 86 (1990).
110 Adam Liptak, Tax Bill Exceeds Award to Officer in Sex Bias Suit, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 11,2002, at 18.
111 207 F. Supp. 2d 764 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
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discrimination, including sexual harassment, in violation of Title VII
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, was awarded $300,000 in compensatory
damages,112 plus $950,000 for her attorneys' fees. 113 The fee award was
especially large because of the extraordinary dilatory and
1l4
obstructionist tactics of the defendant. If the plaintiff must report as
income the entire $1,250,000 recovery, including the attorneys' fees as
well as her compensatory damages, her AMT liability will be
approximately $345,000, or $45,000 more than her compensatory
d amage award.
1~

B. The Spurious Distinction: Settlements Versus Judgments
During oral argument, several Justices indicated that they were
well aware of the conflict with fee-shifting statutes,116 and the Court's
opinion refers to the problem:
Treating the [attorney] fee award as income to the plaintiff in
such cases, it is argued, can lead to the perverse result that the
plaintiff loses money by winning the suit ... [and] would
undermine the effectiveness of fee-shifting statutes in
deputizing plaintiffs and their lawyers to act as private
117
attorneys genera1.
A neutral observer therefore might reasonably have expected the
Court to address and attempt to resolve the conflict, particularly since
Mr. Banks' employment discrimination claim was brought under
federal and state laws that provide for fee-shifting and the Court had
previously observed that, when possible, courts should construe a

Id. at 779.
113 Spina v. Forest Pres. Dist. of Cook County, No. 98-C-1393, 2002 WL 1770010,
at *9 (N.D. Ill. Jul. 31, 2002).
114 Id. at *4.
112

Assuming that the taxpayer is married and has no other income or deductions,
her AMT income is the entire $1,250,000 amount. 1.R.c. § 55(d)(1)(B), (d)(3)(B).
The first $175,000 of AMT income is taxed at a rate of 26%, and any additional AMT
income is taxed at a rate of 28%. I.R.C. § 55(b)(1)(A)(i). The tax due on the first
$175,000 of AMT income is $45,500, the tax due on the $1,075,000 of additional AMT
income is $301,000, and the total tax due under the AMT is $346,500. The net loss to
the prevailing plaintiff is nearly $46,500.
116
•
Transcnpt of Oral Argument, supra note 63, at *24, *26-28, 2004 WL 2513558.
117 Commissioner v. Banks, 125 S. Ct. 826, 834 (2005).
115
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118

statute to "foster harmony" with other statutory law. Yet the Court
makes no attempt to harmonize the Code and federal and state
statutes with fee-shifting provisions, asserting that it need not address
the conflict because in Banks there was no court-ordered fee award,
"nor was there any indication ... that the contingent fee paid to
Banks' attorney was in lieu of statutory fees Banks might otherwise
have been entitled to recover.,,119
The Court's statement that there was no indication that the
contingent fee was in lieu of statutory fees is simply wrong. Mr.
Banks' complaint recited that one of his claims was for attorneys' fees
under the fee-shifting provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,120 and
the settlement agreement recited that Mr. Banks was to receive
121
$464,000 in satisfaction of all his claims.
Thus, the settlement
necessarily included the settlement value of his claim for attorneys'
fees as well as the settlement value of his other claims.
The Court's additional statement that it was unnecessary to
address the significance of fee-shifting in Mr. Banks' case because
there had been no court-ordered fee award is inconsistent with settled
tax law principles and practices. The Service and the courts routinely
determine the tax treatment of an amount received in settlement of a
claim by how the amount would have been taxed if received in a
122
judgment. The leading treatise on the taxation of recoveries states:
"For federal income tax purposes, it is irrelevant whether proceeds
are received as a result of settlement or judgment; i.e., there is no
difference whether litigation (or the threat of litigation) is concluded
through court adjudication or by agreement of the parties."I23
For example, a settlement of a claim for lost wages is taxed in the
118 See Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 879 (1994);
Bhd. of R.R Trainmen v. Chi. River & Ind. RR Co., 353 U.S. 30,40-42 (1957).
119 Banks, 125 S. Ct. at 834.
120 Commissioner v. Banks, Nos. 03-892, 03-907, 2004 WL 1562987 at *49-51
(June 14,2004) Uoint appendix to filings for writ of certiorari in U.S. Supreme Court).
121 The settlement agreement recited that "[t]he parties desire to compromise
and settle all claims which are, have been, or could have been asserted by plaintiff
against defendants" and characterized the settlement payment as "full and complete
satisfaction" of Mr. Banks' claims. [d. at *23-24.
122 See Bagley v. Commissioner, 105 T.C. 396, 406 (1995), affd, 121 F.3d 393 (8th
Cir. 1997); Sager Glove Corp. v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 1173,1180 (1961), affd, 311
F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1962); Estate of Longino v. Commissioner, 32 T.e. 904, 905 (1959).
123 ROBERT W. WOOD, TAXATION OF DAMAGE AWARDS AND SETTLEMENT
PA YMENTS !j[ 1.2 (3d ed. 2005).
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same way as a judgment that awards damages for a claim of lost
124
wages. Similarly, the settlement of a claim for attorneys' fees under
a fee-shifting statute should be taxed in the same way as a judgment
that awards the fees under a fee-shifting statute. How else could the
tax treatment of the settlement possibly be determined other than by
reference to what would have been the tax treatment of a judgment?
Amounts received in settlement are in place of what might otherwise
have been received by way of judgment and should be taxed
accordingly. Thus, the absence of a court-ordered fee award does not
justify the Court's decision not to address the conflict with fee-shifting
statutes.
C. Should the Writ of Certiorari Have Been Dismissed?

In a supplementary brief filed a few days before oral argument,
Mr. Banks and Mr. Banaitis suggested that, in light of the Jobs Act
amendment to the Code that made attorneys' fees fully deductible in
the future in all civil rights and employment cases, the Court should
125
dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.
Given the
Jobs Act, the Court could well have concluded that the issues raised in
Banks and Banaitis were no longer of such pressing national
importance and that it would be a waste of judicial resources to hear
the cases.
The Court was certainly aware of the legislation, noting that the
Jobs Act offered an additional reason for not addressing the conflict
126
between the tax law and fee-shifting statutes. Having proceeded to
decide the case on the merits, however, it was unprincipled to
disregard the conflict on the basis of a spurious distinction between
settlements and judgments and because of legislation resolving the
issue for future cases. The Court should either have dismissed the
writ as improvidently granted or should have confronted the conflict
between the tax law and the fee-shifting provisions of federal statutes.

124

Hodge v. Commissioner, 64 T.e. 616 (1975).
Joint Supplemental Brief of Respondents, 2004 WL 2407555.
126
Commissioner v. Banks, 125 S. Ct. 826, 834 (2005) ("Also, the amendment
added by the American Jobs Creation Act redresses the concern for many, perhaps
most, claims governed by fee-shifting statutes.").
125
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Court's opinion sustaining the position of the government in
Banks and Banaitis is poorly reasoned and unpersuasive. Assignment
of income principles are irrelevant once the settlement is
characterized as the joint product of the plaintiff's asset and the
attorneys' services. There is no explanation why the duties owed by
the attorney to a client under state law preclude taxing the plaintiff on
his proportionate share of a recovery but no more. The disregard of
the conflict with fee-shifting provisions of federal statutes depends on
an untenable distinction between settlements and judgments.
Additional concerns expressed by the Justices during oral
argument are equally groundless. There is no merit to the suggestion
that joint production does not distinguish Banks and Banaitis from
Lucas.
The notion that the plaintiff's position, but not the
government's, would create arbitrary differences among similarly
situated taxpayers is also incorrect.
Although the Jobs Act undoes the damage in the future for
specified categories of litigation, including a wide array of civil rights
and employment cases, there remain significant instances, including
nonphysical torts such as defamation, ordinary tort litigation involving
punitive damages, environmental statutes with fee-shifting provisions,
and any judgment or settlement reached before October 22, 2004, to
which the new law does not apply.127 Under Banks and Banaitis,
plaintiffs in such cases must report as gross income the contingent-fee
portion of a recovery. The result will be to overstate the plaintiff's
actual income, overtax the plaintiff, and undermine the objectives of
the fee-shifting provisions of federal statutes.

127

American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418.
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